Edward Crowther – лучшие книги

On 24 February 2022, eight years after invading the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine and organising an illegal referendum in support of a subsequent Russian annexation, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both Western and Russian intelligence services expected the invasion to quickly topple the democratically elected government in Kyiv and, with the help of collaborators, to overrun the Ukrainian armed forces in a matter of between 3 and 14 days.

Early on 24 February, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) launched a series of missile and artillery strikes on the main air bases and dozens of other military facilities in Ukraine. Immediately afterwards, the VSRF launched a ground invasion, with its forces advancing on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Melitopol, and Kherson. Although following a build-up that had begun in April 2021, and expected by many, the onslaught still came as a major surprise for the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian armed forces, and the majority of its allies in the West, and also for the mass of officers and other ranks of the VSRF, many of whom believed that they were only to participate in exercises.

However, the deeper the Russians rolled into Ukraine, the more resistance they encountered: while some Russian units performed as expected, elsewhere whole armies began falling apart when ordered to advance at maximum possible speed without the necessary firepower and logistic support. After suffering catastrophic losses while failing to reach downtown Kyiv, and failing to reach and enter Chernihiv and Kharkiv, the war in northern and north-eastern Ukraine quickly settled down into a bloody stalemate. In the south, the Russians initially advanced at an astonishing rate, securing Melitopol during the second day of their invasion, and Kherson only a few days later. It was only once President Putin attempted to accelerate the rate of advance through ordering heliborne operations deeper into Ukraine that the VSRF suffered a severe blow in the fighting for Voznesensk and Mykolaiv, and its advance in this part of the country also came to an end.

Richly illustrated with colour photography and full colour artworks, and providing a detailed study of the organisation and order of battle of the armed forces involved on both sides, Volume 2 of War in Ukraine provides the first detailed account of the first two weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

War in Ukraine, Volume 3: Armed formations of the Luhansk People’s Republic, 2014–2022 focuses on the armed formations of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), one of the two separatist entities in the east of Ukraine. This volume aims to provide an overview of their formation in 2014, status up to the end of February 2022 (with some observations on their activities since the launch of Russia’s ‘Special Military Operation’), and combat equipment, while also exploring issues around identity and symbology.

Since their formation in the fighting in eastern Ukraine during 2014, the armed formations of the Luhansk People’s Republic have been slowly consolidated into a more integrated fighting force. However, key units still maintain individual identities and centres of power. One area of focus of the title will be the technological improvisation of the Luhansk People’s Republic, which includes the creation of hybrid armoured vehicles of types not seen elsewhere. The extensive visual propaganda culture around the armed formations of the Luhansk People’s Republic is also explored.

War in Ukraine, Volume 3: Armed formations of the Luhansk People’s Republic, 2014–2022 also presents a wealth of unique visual material including unit patches, photographs, diagrams and maps, and will be of interest to anyone studying the conflict in Ukraine.

Volume 1 of War in Ukraine focuses on the armed formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), the largest of the two separatist entities in the east of Ukraine. Armed formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic aims to provide an overview of their formation in 2014, their status up to the end of February 2022, and combat equipment, while also exploring issues around identity and symbology.

Loosely confederated with the armed formations of the neighbouring Luhansk People’s Republic into the so-called ‘United Armed Forces of Novorossiya’, in reality the armed formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic have retained a degree of autonomy over their units and planning. Often dismissed in existing literature as mere proxy extensions of Russian forces, since their formation in the fighting in eastern Ukraine during 2014 the armed formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic have developed into an integrated fighting force with more main battle tanks than several major Western military powers combined. The title also details some of the key military commanders who have shaped the armed formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic since 2014.

One area of focus of the title explores the unusual and little-known ‘home grown’ military technological developments made by the Donetsk People’s Republic, including multiple launch rocket systems, armoured vehicles, sniper rifles, small arms and remote weapons stations.

The emerging visual propaganda culture around the armed formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic is also explored, with military glory and fallen personnel commemorated in large scale military parades, murals, monuments and even postage stamps.

War in Ukraine Volume 1: Armed formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic also presents a wealth of unique visual material including unit patches, a selection of unique photographs, diagrams and maps, and will be of interest to anyone studying the conflict in Ukraine.