José Augusto Matos — новинки

In March 1974, a climate of conspiracy reigned in Portugal. Premier Marcello Caetano, insisted on the continuation of the Portuguese presence in Africa and the wars being waged against the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. Costa Gomes and Spínola, Portugal’s two most senior generals, did not share this view. Spínola, with Costa Gomes's permission, had published Portugal e o Futuro (Portugal and the Future), a book that questioned the policy that had been followed until then, and caused a major political earthquake throughout Portugal and its colonies.

At the same time, a movement of young captains prepared the overthrow of the regime. Tired of the war in Africa and the government's inability to solve the overseas problem, the conspirators drew up plans to end the dictatorship and establish a democratic regime in Portugal. A first coup attempt on 16 March 1974 was neutralised by government forces, but the second attempt on 25 April was an overwhelming success. In under 24 hours, the insurgents controlled the streets of the capital and Marcello Caetano was surrounded by rebel forces. With no options remaining, Caetano would hand power to General Spínola, who would become the new leader of the emerging regime. The people took to the streets of Lisbon to give red flowers to the soldiers, earning these events the name of ‘The Carnation Revolution.’

Carnation Revolution Volume 2: Coup in Portugal, April 1974 offers a detailed account of the intertwining political and military events of March and April 1974 in and around Lisbon as power swung irretrievably from a dictatorial government to a military intent on ending the colonial wars in Africa and restoring democracy to Portugal. This volume is illustrated throughout with original photographs and includes specially commissioned colour artworks.

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its military strategy and political pacification programme on this singular advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP – despite the many challenges it faced – proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC rebels, which was fighting for the colony’s independence from European rule.

The air war for Guinea stands as a remarkable episode in air power history for several reasons. It was, for example, the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organised air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralisation doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. Ultimately, the FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded, in turn, its own operational initiative; the battlefield effectiveness of increasingly air-dependent ground forces; Portuguese military morale and national resilience; and ultimately, Lisbon’s tenability as an imperial power. The air war for Portuguese Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value – and vulnerabilities – of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of overreliance on air supremacy.

This, the second of three volumes in the Sanctuary Lost mini-series, examines the evolution of Portuguese air power and guerrilla air defences during the conflict’s most active years, as both sides sought the means and methods required to counter the other’s efforts to control Guinea’s airspace. It is richly illustrated throughout with original photographs and includes specially commissioned colour artworks.

On 25 April 1974, a movement of young captains brought down, with practically no resistance, the dictatorial regime that had been in power for over 40 years in Portugal. In the early hours of that day, a military movement unleashed a series of operations that, in less than 24 hours, defeated the forces loyal to the regime, neutralising any possibility of reaction. Few forces resisted the insurgents, and the only resistance worthy of note came from the political police, who in the heat of the revolution opened fire on the surrounding crowd causing four deaths.

In the streets of Lisbon, the people enthusiastically joined the military revolt and started offering food, drinks, and red carnations to the soldiers, who decided to stick them in the barrels of their rifles, leading to the revolt being known as the Carnation Revolution. Although it began with a military coup d'état, 25 April paved the way for democracy, and there is no comparison to other similar revolutions. It was also a unique event in the European context of the time that broke Portugal's isolation and brought it closer to other Western democracies.

This book is the first in a two-volume history. It describes the background to the revolution, the causes that led to the revolt of the captains and the situation in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, where guerrilla wars for their independence had been going on for more than a decade. Carnation Revolution Volume 1: The Road to the Coup that Changed Portugal is richly illustrated with photographs and specially commissioned artworks.

Through late 1987 and early 1988, the battlefields of southern Angola moved ever further away from the border with South West Africa/Namibia, until the showdown between the Soviet and Cuban-supported government in Luanda and South African-supported insurgency of UNITA culminated in the controversial and still much disputed Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

During this period, Angolan and Cuban airpower slowly grew to a point where it outmatched the SAAF, in turn limiting the freedom of movement of the SADF and UNITA ground forces, and reducing their operations to attritional battles, with little chance of achieving major victories on terms acceptable to the government in Pretoria.

As the changing political climate between East and West, and in Africa began to bring about and end to the South African intervention in Angola and the occupation of South West Africa/Namibia, the government of Angola was able to switch its attentions to dealing with UNITA.

Volume 5 of War of Intervention in Angola examines in detail this final period of Cuban involvement in the long and tragic civil war that ruined Angola between 1975 and 1992. While the emphasis is upon the operations of the Angolan and Cuban air forces, it also details how these impacted upon the ground operations of all parties. This volume is richly illustrated with original photographs of the forces involved, specially commissioned maps of the ground operations, and a range of full colour artworks.

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict, Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its strategy on this advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP – despite the many challenges it faced – proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC, which was fighting for Guinea's independence.

The air war for Guinea is unique for historians and analysts for several reasons. It was the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organised air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralisation doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. The FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded in turn its own operational freedom and the effectiveness of the increasingly air-dependent surface forces, which felt that the war against the PAIGC was lost. The air war for Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value – and vulnerabilities – of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of overreliance on air supremacy.

Volume 1 of Sanctuary Lost is extensively illustrated with photographs and specially commissioned colour artworks.

War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4, continues the coverage of the operational history of the Angolan Air Force and Air Defence Force (FAPA/DAA) as told by Angolan and Cuban sources, in the period 1985-1987.

Many accounts of this conflict – better known in the West as the ‘Border War’ or the ‘Bush War’, as named by its South African participants – consider the operations of the FAPA/DAA barely worth commentary. At most, they mention a few air combats involving Mirage F.1 interceptors of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in 1987 and 1988, and perhaps a little about the activity of the FAPA/DAA’s MiG-23s. However, a closer study of Angolan and Cuban sources reveals an entirely different image of the air war over Angola in the 1980s: indeed, it reveals the extent to which the flow of the entire war was dictated by the availability – or the lack – of air power. These issues strongly influenced the planning and conduct of operations by the commanders of the Angolan and Cuban forces.

Based on extensive research with the help of Angolan and Cuban sources, War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4, traces the Angolan and Cuban application of air power between 1985-1987 – during which it came of age – and the capabilities, intentions, and the combat operations of the air forces in support of the major ground operations Second Congress and Salute to October.

The volume is illustrated with over 80 rarely seen photographs, 5 original maps and 21 colour profiles, and provides a unique source of reference on this subject.

In the early hours of 22 November 1970, six Portuguese warships surrounded Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea, on the West African coast. Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, a military force landed on the northern and southern coasts of the sleeping city. At the head of these men was a young Portuguese marine officer, Commander Alpoim Calvão, who had been appointed to command this secret operation, codenamed Green Sea - Mar Verde in Portuguese.

The main objective of the invasion was to promote a coup d'état in the former French colony and overthrow the regime of President Sékou Touré, who supported the guerrillas of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), who were fighting for the independence of Portuguese Guinea.

The invaders also sought to destroy the naval resources that the guerrillas and the Guinean navy had in the port of Conakry, capture the leader of the party, Amilcar Cabral, and rescue a group of Portuguese soldiers held in a PAIGC prison.

The incursion would not have the expected success concerning the coup d'état, and Portugal would be condemned by international organizations for the invasion of a sovereign state, but this operation would remain in the memory of many as the most daring carried out during the colonial war in Africa, although the Portuguese regime never recognised its involvement.

Mar Verde is the first detailed English-language account of this controversial operation and is richly illustrated with a wide range of contemporary photographs and a number of original colour artworks.

Most accounts of the conflict known in the West as the ‘Border War’ barely mention the operations by the FAPA/DAA. A handful of published histories mention two MiG-21s claimed as shot down by Dassault Mirage F.1 interceptors of the South African Air Force in 1981 and 1982, and perhaps something of the activities of its MiG-23 interceptors during the battles of the 1987-1988 period.

The story told by Angolan and Cuban sources reveals an entirely different image of the air war over Angola in the 1980s: indeed, it reveals to what degree this conflict was dictated by the availability – or the lack – of air power and shows that this issue dictated the way that the commanders of the Cuban contingents in Angola – whether as advisors or as combat troops – planned and conducted their operations.

The first contingent of Cuban troops deployed to Angola during Operation Carlota, in late 1975, included a sizeable group of pilots and ground personnel who subsequently helped build-up the FAPA/DAA from virtually nothing. They continued that work over the following 14 years – sometimes with the cooperation of Soviet advisors and others from East European countries – eventually establishing an Angolan air force that by 1988 maintained what South African military intelligence and the media subsequently described as the ‘most advanced air defence system in Africa’. The air defence system and aircraft ultimately managed a unique feat in contemporary military history: they enabled an air force equipped with Soviet-made aircraft and trained under Soviet doctrine to establish at least a semblance of aerial superiority over an air force equipped with Western-made aircraft and operating under Western doctrine.

Based on extensive research with the help of Angolan and Cuban sources, War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 3, traces the military build-up of the FAPA/DAA in the period 1975-1985, its capabilities and its intentions. Moreover, it provides a unique, blow-by-blow account of its combat operations and experiences. The volume is illustrated with rare photographs, and maps and colour profiles, and provides a unique source of reference on this topic.