Больше цитат
- Все цитаты из книги «On Mental Toughness (сборник)»
- Все цитаты из книг Warren G. Bennis
- Все цитаты из книг Ron Ashkenas
- Все цитаты из книг Robert J. Thomas
- Все цитаты из книг Митчел Ли Маркс
- Все цитаты из книг Джим Лоэр
- Все цитаты из книг Тони Шварц
- Все цитаты из книг Мартин Зелигман
- Все цитаты из книг Graham Jones
- Все цитаты из книг Jeff Weiss
- Все цитаты из книг Roderick Gilkey
- Все цитаты из книг Clint Kilts
- Все цитаты из книг Alia Crum
- Все цитаты из книг Thomas Crum
- Все цитаты из книг Joshua D. Margolis
- Все цитаты из книг Paul G. Stoltz
- Все цитаты из книг Philip Mirvis
- Все цитаты из книг Glenn E. Mangurian
- Все цитаты из книг Aram Donigian
- Все цитаты из книг Jonathan Hughes
- Все цитаты из книг Sarah Green Carmichael
- Все цитаты пользователя milenat
Upon his arrival in Afghanistan, Captain John Chang found that his company's Afghan National Army counterparts were regularly using threats, especially in dangerous or high-stakes contexts, to change the local population's behaviour. Chang knew enough about both Afghan culture and the Koran to understand the value the locals put on respectful treatment. He decided that if he could change the way his soldiers interacted with the ANA, he could affect how the ANA worked with the villagers. He invited ANA soldiers to move into the Americans' combat outpost. The two units began to eat, train, plan, patrol and relax together, resulting in a true partnership. Within a month the ANA was serving as an advocate for the U.S.-led mission, explaining to village elders that the Americans were guests in their country - operating to help people at the request of the Afghan government - and reminding them of the cultural importance of hospitality in Afghanistan.
When violence later erupted in the area, a precedent had been set. Rather than make threats, Captain Chang and his ANA counterpart solicited recommendations from the village elders about how to provide better security in the valley and asked what justifications the elders would need to defend any pacts the U.S. and ANA forces made. The elders voiced their objections to coalition forces' searching homes, detaining people in the middle of the night, and randomly stopping and searching vehicles. They talked about being afraid to hunt or to let livestock graze in the mountains, where U.S. forces were shooting artillery. Any negotiated agreement about reducing the violence, they advised, would have to show respect for personal liberties and local laws. Most important, it should look like an ANA - not a U.S. - solution. Chang and his ANA counterpart crafted an agreement that the elders could defend to the populace, and Taliban recruitment in the area dropped significantly.